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ABSTRACT
The following discussion adds to the discourse regarding the relation-
ship between public administration reform and ethics policies. In this 
theoretical paper, a narrative is employed that re-reads the old Webe-
rian model as a model of ‘institutional integrity’, which is slowly replaced 
by a public management concept that focuses on individual integrity. 
Whereas the Weberian concept defined institutional integrity as a qual-
ity of institutions, more recent management concepts define institu-
tional integrity as a quality of public officers within institutions. This also 
explains why the current focus of attention is ever more on individuals 
(as the main cause for unethical conduct) and the bad-person model of 
integrity. An alternative framing of this paper is about ‘institutional eth-
ics’ over time. During the last decades, we are moving from an institu-
tional, but mechanical and rigid Weberian model, to an individual, but 
more fluid New Public Management model. We are moving towards a 
version of institutional integrity that tries to use new behavioural mech-
anism to get back to some Weberian virtues, without its structures and 
technical focus. This novel ‘integrity management’ movement is really all 
about filling the gaps left by New Public Management doctrines. How-
ever, the reform of integrity management also develops into a special-
ised, sophisticated and professionalised ethics bureaucracy. Trends are 
towards ever more broader and stricter integrity requirements. Still, eth-
ics policies are ineffective and shortcomings in implementing integrity 
policies are neglected.
Keywords: integrity management, ethics, bureaucracy, public management reform, 
behavioural policies
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1 Introduction and research question
Originally, this paper started as a desk-research paper at the University of 
Oxford (Blavatnik School of Government). The intention was to analyze the 
link between public management reform and ethics management reforms. 
How did the reform process changed the conceptualization of ethics policies 
and ethics management? How did the institutionalisation of ethics policies 
changed? Have ethics policies become more effective over time? And – which 
role and importance is allocated to individuals and which role to institutions? 
As the paper evolved, we also decided to use empirical insights from one 
of the most comprehensive empirical studies about the effectiveness of 
ethics policies and the institutionalization of ethics in the European Union 
(European Parliament, 2020). This study was carried out by the author in the 
year 2020. Overall, 18 Member States of the European Union contributed to 
the survey. The objective of the study was to survey and compare policies 
and implementation practices where they exist. Apart from this task, another 
objective was to discuss the emergence of integrity policies as a political 
topic with growing importance and the increasing difficulties to manage and 
to institutionalise ethics policies. Overall, the study concludes that current 
integrity policies are highly ineffective, despite the expansion of ethics policies 
and developments towards the emergence of a new ethics bureaucracy 
throughout the last years. There is no place here to further discuss the 
study in detail. As such, in this paper, we are interested in the (theoretical) 
interpretation of the results: Why are current integrity policies not more 
effective than traditional integrity policies? How did our understanding of 
ethics policies and the institutionalisation of ethics policies change over time 
– and why?
2 The weberian bureaucratic model as model of 
institutional integrity
Organizational theory claims that organizational settings influence people´s 
way of thinking and their behaviour, and hence the content of public policy. 
Therefore, an organizational theory approach of integrity policies assumes 
that it is impossible to understand integrity policies without the way public 
institutions work and without analysing how they are organized and their 
modes of working (Christensen, Laegreid and Rovik, 2020, p.1). Following 
this, institutional integrity can be defined as a quality of institutions that is 
supposed to promote the quality of public employees. Starting from this defi-
nition, we suggest to re-read the bureaucratic model as the first (ineffective) 
institutional model of ‘institutional integrity’. This (failed) model is being re-
placed by highly professional integrity policies that are not integrated into 
new institutional logics.
In most countries worldwide, public institutions were created as distinct struc-
tures with the objective of making the public sector independent from the 
private sector and public officials independent from personal and political in-
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terests. Originally, modern public institutions were conceptualized as rational 
machines which had democratic and ethical tasks of serving the society and the 
law, protect citizens, operate equitably and impartial. In almost all countries, 
constitutions, public organisations and civil service acts resulted in provisions 
that were loaded with legal obligations, values and principles and the need to 
have neutral, loyal and impartial state servants with very specific employment 
conditions and institutional features. This technical, legalistic and bureaucratic 
compliance and “ethics of neutrality” concept (Thompson, 1985) dominated 
until late in the 20st century. Traditional administrative theory also supported 
the view that administration should be a neutral body and separated from 
political interests. Some parts of these doctrines have survived until today: 
Experts still discuss how “policy capture” (defined as situations where public 
decisions over policies are consistently directed away from the public interest 
towards a specific interests) and can be avoided (OECD, 2017).
Still, one of the remnant of former times is that all countries share the un-
derstanding that no other institutional actor other than the public actor can 
combine public values such as expertise, continuity, professionalism, impar-
tiality, equity, non-discrimination and fairness (van der Meer, Raadschelders 
and Toonen, 2015, p. 369; OECD, 2019).
Because of the specific ethical importance of certain state tasks, most coun-
tries are also reluctant to totally reverse, modify or change the specific in-
stitutional and employment features founded in the 19th century in order 
to protect the democratic liberal state. Bekke & van der Meer (2001) define 
modern public institutions as depersonalised systems which differ from tradi-
tional modes of “personalised” government. In the 19th century, the biggest 
changes included the introduction of centralized recruitment procedures, 
the adoption of civil service laws, the centralization of HR policies and the 
introduction of merit principles (including entrance examinations, job tenure, 
career service, political neutrality) which were adopted – as a moral guardian 
to democracy – and which should shield employees from politically inspired 
employment actions. Consequently, almost all countries designed their pub-
lic organizations in specific ways because they expected a certain ethical be-
havior on the part of civil servants would result from specific organizational 
features. In the United States, according to Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996, p. 
22), the progressive reform movement and the scientific administration re-
formers believed that government integrity would flow from sound adminis-
tration. Therefore, in a next step (and well within the 20th century), countries 
introduced hierarchical organizational structures, scientific management 
methods, clear and rigid career paths, life-time tenure, full-time employment, 
seniority, advantageous pension systems and rigid remuneration systems in 
order to reduce as far as possible the risk of too much political influence, cor-
ruption, misconduct, the exercise of private interests and state capture for 
private interests. Administrative behavior was to follow hierarchical principles 
and doctrines which were based on the rule of law. Following this, at a mini-
mal level, administration was considered to be good and ethical if it achieved 
the implementation and enforcement of the existing laws and policy goals of 
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the Government of the day. Moreover, ethically good or acceptable behavior 
was also defined in terms of rationality, impartiality and standardization.
For a long time, experts were convinced that these specific organizational 
structures, principles and compliance approaches implicitly “produce” a cer-
tain personality (Merton, 1987), public service ethos, and “public service moti-
vation” for civil servants who – in exchange – would be committed to the public 
good, neutrality, impartiality and displaying expertise. Thus, the concept of a 
bureaucratic organizational structure was to produce a certain ethical climate 
and the commitment to the public good, neutrality, impartiality and to ob-
serving confidentiality and displaying expertise. Bureaucracy was a synonym 
for institutional integrity (Demmke, 2019). It was the last existing coherent 
institutional integrity concept, at least in theory. Until today, this traditional 
rational, technical and instrumental understanding of public institution and in-
tegrity has not completely vanished. Instead, whatever is the correct diagnosis 
of current reform trends, it is worth noting that until today, no government 
has completely abolished all bureaucratic features. Moreover, no government 
has privatized the delivery of public tasks, no public administration works like 
a private company, and no public institutional system entirely emulates pri-
vate sector practices. Therefore, in all countries worldwide, despite ongoing 
reforms, Government institutional frameworks are still perceived as being dif-
ferent compared to private sector features. Institutional regimes based on the 
rule of law, impartiality, merit and freedom of the media and justice (should) 
offer constraints upon corrupt and arbitrary political power (Lane, 2014).
However, as we will see, almost all of these traditional “bureaucratic” and 
“integrity” features are about to change bureaucratic structures, distinctions 
between the public and private sphere, legal and institutional principles and 
values and (rational) logics. With very uncertain outcomes.
3 Why countries started to deviate from the traditional 
government models?
When looking back, the traditional technical, legalistic and bureaucratic com-
pliance and ethics of neutrality (Thompson, 1985) approach was very influen-
tial until at least the 1970´s. “Bureaucracy was the model of public administra-
tion admired by Woodrow Wilson and other Progressives precisely because 
it promised to be an antidote to the corrupt spoils system” (Anechiarico and 
Jacobs, 1996, p. 173).
However, increasingly, almost all countries started to deviate from the classical 
bureaucratic model, because the concept underperformed on several fronts 
and not only as regards the classical dysfunctions of the classical bureaucratic 
model (too costly, discriminatory, too rigid, too hierarchical, not innovative, 
not performing, de-motivating effects). According to Anechiarico and Jacobs, 
“Public administration did not become professionalized like law and medicine” 
(Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996, p. 21). Another problem with the concept of 
bureaucracy is, because as an ethical guideline, it is simply too narrow for to-
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day’s multi-level governance. Especially the importance of individuals was ne-
glected because of the focus on the concept of “administrative neutrality” and 
the dominance of rational and legal approaches. Today, trends are towards 
the opposite and the growing importance of individuals. Insights from behav-
ioral economy and motivation theory have indeed shown that work in the pub-
lic sector is more value-laden and more unpredictable than ever.
Public institutions are also subject of changes, not only as a result of rational-, 
financial- and technological pressures but also as a result of changing atti-
tudes, norms, fashions, changing cognitive-cultural patterns (Di Maggio and 
Powell, 1983). This change process not only challenges rational choice theo-
ries and emphasizes the role of values, norms, structures and processes – and 
people. Instead, it also changes the classical (at least in theory) coherent re-
lationship between bureaucratic features and integrity. Today, institutional 
features are separated from integrity features. Modern integrity policies have 
become a proper public policy and current developments in the field of pub-
lic management have expanded the meaning, importance and the practical 
expression of the concept of integrity policies and integrity management. 
Overall, integrity management is not only becoming more professional, bet-
ter institutionalized, complex and costly. Instead, managerial instruments like 
value management, purpose driven management and value-scorecard´s are 
also becoming a fashion (in the sense of sociological institutionalism and iso-
morphism). As a result, the concept of integrity management develops into 
a popular, distinctive, specialized, sophisticated and professionalized policy 
that fills the ethical gaps that new management logics produce.
Still, it is difficult to say whether integrity management has also become more 
effective. Often, it seems, integrity policies are adopted as a reaction to me-
diated political scandals and because these policies are “cheap” and their im-
plementation and monitoring is weak. Overall, integrity policies and integrity 
management can also be characterized as self-reinforcing processes that are 
highly change resistant and continue to follow the logic of ever more and ever 
stricter policies (Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 17). Change resistant means that it is 
simply impossible to call for a deregulation of ethics policies in certain areas, 
or – sometimes – even to criticize the ineffectiveness of chosen approaches. All 
of these trends, in turn, create a number of integrity-paradoxes (Nieuwenburg, 
2007) such as the emergence of an ethics bureaucracy in times of de-bureau-
cratisation, attempts to enhance trust but – often – rising levels of distrust as 
a result. If in the past, there were seen to be regulatory gaps and a lack of 
enforcement, the more recent concern is that some governments have gone 
overboard in building an elaborate ethics apparatus that reflects the prevail-
ing negative assumptions about the motivations and capabilities of both politi-
cians and public servants. Today, trying to be ethical in every sense of the word, 
could mean that public organizations and their leaders end up pleasing no one.
Until today, there is indeed no evidence that bureaucratic structures have pro-
duced the intended integrity results. Evidence is growing that specific public 
working conditions and bureaucratic structures did not necessarily produce 
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less corruption and a specific public service ethos. Dahlström and Lapuente 
(Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017) examine the existing link between bureau-
cratic structures and corruption. Both authors also conclude that closed bu-
reaucracies are negatively related to the quality of governance. In ”The Merit 
of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of 
Corruption” Dahlström et al (Dahlström et al., 2012; see also Rauch and Ev-
ans, 2000) concluded that only some factors (most notably the meritocratic 
recruitment of public employees) exert a significant influence on curbing 
corruption even when controlling for the impact of most standard political 
variables. Also, the above-mentioned study for the European Parliament con-
cludes that bureaucratic countries have more ethics rules in place than non-
bureaucratic countries. However, there is no evidence to suggest that more 
rules are also more effective.
In Unmasking Administrative Evil, Adams and Balfour (1998) developed the 
concept of administrative evil in connection with a modernized society and 
an administrative culture dominated by technical rationality. According to 
the authors, the Holocaust was only possible in a perfect system of extreme 
obedience, loyalty and technical rationality. Today, it is claimed that also in-
stitutions (as well as individuals) have responsibilities, rights and duties. For 
example, public institutions have the duty to contribute to public values. 
Institutions also have a corporate purpose. Thus, when rephrasing Milton 
Friedman´s claim that “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits” (Friedman, 1970) this looks as follows in the case of public institu-
tions: The Social Responsibility of Public Institutions is to serve public values.
Because of these many shortcomings, de-bureaucratization trends continue 
worldwide. However, there is no common trend towards an alternative uni-
versal administrative model. Rather, current reform modes are caught in an 
identity crisis. Countries know well what they want to leave behind. But they 
do not know where to go. There is – differently to what neo-institutionalists 
expected - no “isomorphism” logic and no trend towards a best-practice mod-
el. During the last decades, all countries worldwide have implemented new 
reforms, which have been successively defined as governance reforms lead-
ing to collaborative governance, a networking society, a co-production soci-
ety, shared governance society, a digital-, or blockchaining society, or, even 
towards the partial return of a strong state, the Leviathan. In the meantime, 
we seem to be living in an era of flexible post-bureaucratic governance. In this 
scenario, government policy styles and public institutional reforms proceed 
from policy to policy and from sector to sector. Also the varieties of post-
bureaucratic governance or New Public Management have been challenged 
owing to the focus on results and cost savings (Hood and Dixon, 2013), com-
pounded by the tendency to downplay the importance of other values and 
principles such as quality, fairness, equality, and impartiality. According to An-
dersson (2019), NPM reforms did not live up to expectations (Kolthoff, 2007):
– First, evidence is mixed regarding if performance has improved or costs 
dropped,
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– Second, the democratic nature of public administration was affected as the 
role of public service consumer substituted the role of citizens,
– Third, fairness as measured by service user´s perceptions seem to have 
worsen
– Fourth, in many cases vulnerability for corruption increased (Andersson, 
2019, p. 9).
Thus, whereas the traditional bureaucratic model is dismissed for many rea-
sons, the emerging institutional models (such as the new public manage-
ment model) lack any integrated and implicit integrity logic. Consequently, 
many countries started to invest in new value-based integrity policies, ethics 
infrastructures and the institutionalisation of ethics in order to compensate 
for the integrity gaps that the emerging institutional and managerial logics 
produced. Anecharico and Jacobs (1996, p. 239) define this as the birth of a 
“panoptic vision” of integrity policies. “They have gone beyond the political, 
legal, and institutional legacies of their predecessors (…). The contemporary 
reformers adopt or invent technologies, institutions, and routines to monitor 
public employees closely” (Anecharico and Jacobs, 1996, p. 23). From here, 
the concept of institutional integrity developed into a policy. Also, the link be-
tween institutional design and integrity is changing. Whereas the traditional 
bureaucratic understanding supported the view that institutional design mat-
ters for individual integrity, examining today´s institutions from the “perspec-
tive of bounded rationality leads quickly to the understanding that the cogni-
tive architectures of individuals affect the institutions they inhabit” (Shannon, 
McGee and Jones, 2019). And, not vice versa, as previously.
4 Beyond the new “old” public management: Institutional 
logics and new complexities
In the new public management context, traditional features like standardized 
procedures and the focus of law, regulation and administrative law are of-
ten seen as constraints that block policy choices, innovation, competition and 
individualism. Traditional administrative behaviour is held to be rigid, rule-
bound, centralised and obsessed with dictating how things should be done 
– regulating the process, controlling the inputs – but ignoring the end results. 
In this perspective, legalism is seen as cold, rational and restricting individual 
discretion. Consequently, emerging public management models supported a 
certain decline of established “legalistic” principles that – originally – were 
established in civil service acts and enshrined in many constitutions.
Parallel to these developments, concepts and theories in the fields of or-
ganizational theory, organizational behavior, organizational justice, strategic 
management, ethics, leadership and HRM (including engagement and moti-
vation theories), have grown in complexity. Within these trends, values and 
emotions play an increasing role, such as value-based management, purpose 
driven management, or – in the private sector, corporate social responsibility. 
Compared to the traditional bureaucratic concept of integrity, it is fair to con-
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clude that, “there has been an “affective revolution” in public management 
since the mid-1990s, focusing initially on new behavioral insights, affective 
dispositions and HR-decisions based on (increasing) individual discretion of 
managers (Demmke, 2019). In the field of Public Management, Human re-
source management (HRM) is gaining popularity, especially as regards a quan-
tification and psychologization of research (Godard, 2014; Budds, 2019). “The 
field has moved away from a simple mechanistic view of the effects of emo-
tions via their associated action tendencies to a more sophisticated, nuanced, 
and contingent view of how emotions contribute to behavior” (Godard, 
2014). These trends towards the growing importance of individuals in HRM 
studies are in conformity with the growing popularity of micropolitics (Burns, 
1961) in the field of organizational theory, and the attention to the concept 
of a society of “singularities” (Reckwitz, 2017) in the field of sociology. Diver-
sity and identity politics have become popular in Political Sciences. Accord-
ing to Fukuyama (2018), universal concepts are being challenged by the rise 
of identity politics (Fukuyama, 2018, xvi); whereas new forms of recognition 
based on nation, religion, sect, race, ethnicity, or gender play an increasingly 
prominent role. In the field of organizational justice, expert´s discussion focus 
on the responsibilities of people for their choices and the outcomes of their 
choices and whether new justice concepts should be made more sensitive to 
individual responsibility (Knight and Stemplowska, 2014). Take the case of the 
changing concept of equality and equity: Equality refers to a situation where 
everyone is given equal resources, whereas equity refers to achieving an 
equality of outcomes (that is, the resources are related to needs). Today, clas-
sical interpretations of both concepts are under pressure because of recent 
changes in the discourse about inequality and new discussions about another 
fundamental moral ideal in Western societies: people should be held person-
ally responsible for the consequences of their choices (Greenfield, 2011). The 
idea of personal responsibility also seems to increasingly involve considera-
tions of merit (choices, talent, and effort) and luck. Also perceptions of fair-
ness and dignity are changing, employers and employees seem to re-evaluate 
distinctions between fair and unfair inequalities. As already mentioned, also 
public employees appear to relate fairness to some level of personal respon-
sibility. And vice versa: Increasingly, employees are seen as responsible and 
called upon to be engaged, committed and continuously adapt their skills 
and competences. Thus, this change of (organisational justice) perceptions of 
values and principles has undeniably been fuelled by the growing influence 
of right-libertarian political views and the growing popularity of post-bureau-
cratic management reforms (Knight and Stemplowska, 2014, p. 1).
5 The effects of the institutional turn on integrity
The above-mentioned “affective”, “behavioural” and “individualized” ap-
proaches can also be interpreted as counter-trends to the past: From ration-
ality to bounded rationality, from hierarchical steering to individual discretion 
and job autonomy, from standardization to destandardisation, from central-
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ized concepts of fairness to individualized concepts of fairness and from ethi-
cal decision-making to bounded ethicality.
Behavioural economics and behavioural ethics (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 
2011; Bazerman et al. 2015; Tenbrunsel and Chugh, 2015; OECD, 2018) are 
viewed as important and increasingly inform policymaking. Approaches that 
are based on standardized assumptions, law and compliance-based approach-
es are believed to be ineffective since they guard only against intentional 
forms of unethical behavior (and not unintentional forms). Behavioral public 
policy and behavioural ethics have also become popular because these con-
cepts offer psychological explanations about organizational and individual 
failure (and because people overestimate their ability to do what is right and 
why they (may) act unethically without meaning to (Bazerman and Tenbrun-
sel, 2011; Ewert, 2020).
As such, these trends are to be welcomed because they illustrate the short-
comings of the classical institutional models. However, the increasing popu-
larity of behavioral sciences in public policies and public ethics are leading 
toward an individualization of integrity policies and a focus on the concept 
of “public-officer ethics” (Kirby, 2020). These developments run counter to 
the discussed grand administrative tradition of the ethics of impartiality and 
compliance-based approaches. Instead, today´s discourses focus on partiality, 
bounded awareness (Bazerman and Sezer, 2016) and value-based approach-
es. Consequently, the “bad apple” or “focus on the person as a root cause, is 
making a reappearance” (Tenbrunsel and Chugh, 2015, p. 207).
Behavioural approaches are also welcome as long as they do not lead to a new 
‘moral relativism’ or the revision of rational thinking as such and the impor-
tance of classical instruments like rules, universal values and principles such as 
the rule of law and the importance of principles of administrative law are not 
being questioned. Moreover, new findings in the field are important as long 
as they do not only redress what philosophers (Immanuel Kant) or sociologists 
(such as Simon, 1997; Lindblom, 1990; Merton, 1936) said well before.
However, relativist approach to the principles of modern administration and 
rationality are emerging (Rutgers, 1999, p. 26), at least in some countries. Ac-
cording to Davies in Nervous States – How Feeling Took Over the World (Davies, 
2019), we are entering a new era in which generalization and assumptions 
that there are laws, principles and values governing society as a whole and 
history as a whole, disappear (Davies, 2019, p. 162). Commitment to societal 
values, objectivity, impartiality and expertise increasingly mean old-fashioned 
group-thinking and the contrary of competition, speed and novelty. In the fu-
ture, “the context for every life choice is that of competition, how to distin-
guish oneself from rivals, by qualification, image-seeking and management 
of oneself” (Davies, 2019, p. 169). Also, in the field of institutional integrity, 
some trends are even towards “spectacular outbursts of irrationality” (Smith, 
2019, p. 7). An important part of the story of how we arrived here seems to 
be the collapse of traditional safeguards for the preservation of rational pro-
cedures and deliberation….” (Smith, 2019, p. 18).
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At this point, it makes sense to refer back to the beginnings of our discussions 
and the definition of modern public institutions as depersonalised systems that 
differ from traditional modes of “personalised” government. Could it be that 
we return and move back to personalised modes of post-modern government?
If this analysis is correct, it is time to re-consider the pros and cons of - at 
least – some traditional and (post-) modern institutional features (and defend 
rationality against irrationality and principles against moral- and cultural rela-
tivism). After all, if rationality is dismissed and universal values are rejected, 
then institutional ethics will be grounded on something arbitrary and modern 
principles are becoming relative. These trends seem to give us the freedom 
to go with any epistemic principle we choose (Lynch, 2017, p. 223). So, what 
could this concept of rational institutional integrity be?
Here, we are moving back to our philosophical discussion at the beginning 
of our deliberations: While it is true that the shift towards a bounded ration-
ality framework may provide scholars with more realistic models of political 
decision-making (Shannon and Zachary, 2019), it should not lose interest in 
the link between integrity and the sociopolitical context and power relations. 
Overall, public institutions must remain spaces of reasons and stick to those 
administrative principles that are still important, such as the principles of rule 
of law, impartiality, equity and fairness.
6 The expansion of the meaning of institutional integrity – 
new complexities and new confusion
In the meantime, almost everywhere, countries have expanded the meaning of 
the concept of institutional integrity. Governments invest in ethics policies and 
in fighting unethical behavior more resources than ever before. In many cases, 
governments have institutionalized ethics infrastructures as a reaction to po-
litical scandals and started to focus on the implementation of ethics policies. 
Overall, ethics policies have become wider, broader, stricter, better institution-
alized and professionalized. According to the above-mentioned study for the 
European Parliament, trends are towards a) more ethics rules and standards 
per country, b) “ethicalisation of rules” (more rules include references to ethics 
and ethical standards), c) the broadening of ethical definitions and d) towards 
stricter ethical standards. Moreover, purpose-driven, value driven manage-
ment approaches and public value management tools such as scorecards are 
high on the agenda. Overall, talking about the need to change corporate- and 
administrative culture via the implementation of values and principles has also 
become important but also trendy and fashionable and – following an utilitar-
ian perspective - an effective marketing tool. In some cases, greedy institutions 
(Coser, 1974) and moral entrepreneurship inform employees how to behave 
(Anderson, 2017), place a stronger emphasis on intrinsic motivators and ask 
employees to be engaged, committed and value driven.
While evidence is indeed mounting that the nature of integrity policies is 
strongly related to changing cognitive and cultural patterns, significant meth-
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odological and theoretical challenges still exist, especially in regard to the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of ethics policies.
For example, experts agree on the importance of ethical leadership for integ-
rity. However, it is difficult to measure ethical leadership. Moreover, from a 
manager´s point of view, daily management is about managing conflicts and 
value dilemmas under high time pressure and financial constraints. From a 
managerial perspective, ethical leadership is a virtue which is difficult to real-
ize in practice. Consequently, “dark leadership” is not going away easily.
As regards the effectiveness of ethics policies, methodologically, there is also 
no consensus regarding the various policies, instruments and mechanism and 
how they impact on ethical outcomes. Whereas sound empirical knowledge 
exists about the positive link between meritocratic structures and levels of 
corruption and politicization, too little evidence exists regarding the link be-
tween flexible Governance trends, HR-reforms, destandardisation, individu-
alization and the impact on ethical leadership and organizational justice and 
fairness perceptions. Therefore, more empirical studies and more non-ideo-
logical deliberations are sorely needed if we are to better understand ethical 
promises, paradoxes, challenges, and limitations. One of these challenges is 
to understand how institutions are changing and how this affects institutional 
integrity and workplace behavior.
As we have seen, the institutional context of public ethics policies is continu-
ously changing, but whether it is changing to the better is not easy to say (Mac-
kenzie, 2002). Instead, the conviction grew that there is no truth, objectivity, 
and rationality, but instead diversity, best-fit, context, contingency, nomi-
nalism, bounded rationality, and individualism. The problem with this trend 
towards relativism and destandardisation is the parallel decline of universal 
standards and basic moral principles. This popularity of moral relativism easily 
deprives of moral confidence, of the sense that we are right to condemn the 
actions of wrongdoers, and relativism removes the sense of conflict between 
apparently conflicting moral judgments that since they are relative, they do 
not really conflict, or the conflicts don´t really matter (Lukes, 2008, p. 18).
At the same time, ministers and top-officials are subject to constant public and 
media scrutiny and (an exponential rise of) ethical and moral scandals. These 
scandals trigger discussions about trust. While it can be doubted that hold-
ers of public office have become more unethical as such, a generalised and 
inflated use of the term moral scandal, the increased (digital) media visibility 
of scandals, and the political abuse of moral issues have negative side-effects 
on trust perceptions. As a consequence, anti-corruption and moral campaigns 
against the elites have helped populists far more than it has helped politi-
cians genuinely committed to fighting anti-corruption and conflicts of inter-
est (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020, p. 100).
The above mentioned study notes a relationship between Good Governance 
and the acceptability of corruption. As such, in countries with a higher democ-
racy index, there is also less acceptance for corruption. Or, vice versa: In coun-
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tries where the democracy index is lower, the acceptance for corruption is also 
higher. These findings are important because they allow for the conclusion 
that the acceptance of unethical conduct is higher in countries with a lower 
democracy index and lower in countries with a higher democracy index. Thus, 
if countries want to take the fight against unethical behaviour and corruption 
seriously, an important precondition for this is to – simultaneously – maintain 
or strengthen systems of good governance. We also note the same logic as 
regards the situation of the rule of law. The higher the rule of law index of a 
country, the less acceptance for corruption. Or vice versa: The lower the rule 
of law index in a country, the higher is the acceptance for corruption. Thus, 
there exists a positive relationship between Government Integrity and unac-
ceptability of corruption. As such, this confirms the hypotheses that Good 
Governance and “ethics pay off”. Moreover, the institutionalisation of ethics 
policies can be expected to lower tolerance for unethical conduct. From this, 
we also draw the conclusion that adoption rules and policies are not enough. 
Instead, it is important to invest in integrity policies and good governance poli-
cies. Of course, these findings are not new. More important is the (empirical) 
confirmation that effective integrity policies pay off in terms of satisfaction 
with the functioning of the democratic system. If people trust in the effective-
ness of ethics policies, they are also likely to trust the public institutions and 
the political system, which is based on Good Governance principles. Apparent-
ly, there is a trade-off between the growing complexity of our societies, the 
need for more, better, clearer, and stricter rules and the increasing number 
of violations. “There are many more laws to be broken nowadays, prosecu-
tors have become more zealous, and resources at their disposal have become 
more plentiful.” (Thompson, 2006, p. 163).
Moral and ethical standards are also changing more rapidly than before. What 
was legal a generation ago is considered unethical today. As discussed, regu-
lation in the field of conflict of interests also takes a stronger prophylactic ap-
proach. Prohibitions are regulated for an increasing variety of circumstances. 
Requirements for disclosure of interests have shifted from an (original) con-
centration on financial issues into other non-pecuniary commitments. Also, 
public opinion has shifted towards an objective conception of conflict and 
a subjective conception of personal interests. Finally, media coverage about 
scandals has dramatically increased and, thus, supports views that unethical 
behaviour is increasing.
Therefore, it is becoming ever more difficult to call for more rational ap-
proaches in the field of integrity and to question the ever-more, ever stricter 
= ever – better logic in the field.
In fact, there is no easy answer as to whether we have too much or too little 
ethics or what the precise impact of specific instruments is on trust, democ-
racy, effectiveness, efficiency, performance and behaviour. At least, recent 
trends indicate a growing interest in evaluating the institutionalisation of eth-
ics and in the right design of ethics infrastructures.
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Thus, the concept of ‘Integrity of Governance’ is more complex than ever. Pro-
gress in the field is combined with new challenges, conflicts and dilemmas. 
As already mentioned, different experts observe trends are moving towards 
a “marketisation of societies”, the return of the Leviathan, developments to-
wards flexible forms of Governance, the emergence of a digitalized shared 
economy and a return to ‘moral politics’ – all in one. To this should be added 
trends to a diversification of institutional systems and organizational struc-
tures. This together presents a highly contradictory scenario.
7 Diverging opinions: Towards best fit- or best-practice 
institutional integrity?
Another trend make it more difficult to define institutional integrity from a 
public management perspective. One reason for this is the fragmented na-
ture of approaches and the proliferation of integrity concepts and theories. 
Overall, academic publications about institutional integrity are becoming 
more complex (Schwartz, Harris and Comer, 2015; Kirby, 2020). According to 
Breaky, Cadman and Sampford (2015, p. 3), Sampford was actually the first 
academic to distinguish between institutional and individual integrity. Since 
then, Hoekstra and Kaptein are the leading experts in the field of institution-
alising (public service) ethics. Also related to the issue of institutional integ-
rity, Cropanzano and Folger (1991) were the first to invent the term of or-
ganizational justice and Linda Trevino the concepts of unethical behavior in 
the workplace and ethical culture (Trevino 1986). In the private sector, the 
concept of managerial ethics was founded by Schminke (1998). The notion 
of integrity systems seems to originate in the works by Jeremy Pope, the 
founder of Transparency International (Pope, 1996). Other concepts discuss 
organizational ethics integrity (Polowczk, 2017) or Handbooks on ethics in-
frastructure concepts (such as those published by the OECD, 2020). As re-
gards the latter, the most important distinction between integrity systems 
(Huberts, Anecharico and Six, 2008, 2012) and ethics infrastructures seems 
to be that the former is a more technical concept and the latter relies on a 
discussion of much broader variables such as the importance of the rule of 
law, democracy and the judiciary (Fernandez and Camacho 2016; Martin and 
Kish-Gephart, 2014). Finally, according to the OECD (Maesschalck and Bertok, 
2009) the concept of integrity management can be defined as the activities 
undertaken to stimulate and enforce integrity and prevent corruption and 
other integrity violations within a particular organization. Integrity manage-
ment is the sum of systematic and integrated efforts to promote integrity 
within public-sector organizations (Kaptein, 1998).
“By definition, integrity management requires an integrated, systematic and 
coherent approach. Integrity instruments and initiatives are more effective 
when they are part of a systematic style (Van Tankeren, 2010). Although the 
importance of such a concerted approach seems almost a matter of course, 
this is not yet the case in many public organizations (Bowman 1990; Lawton 
et al. 2013). (...) Second, integrity management suffers from implementation 
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deficiencies. Integrity policies have repeatedly proven to be a somewhat pa-
per issue that has not received a direct follow-up (Transparency International, 
2012; Van Den Heuvel and Huberts, 2003). (…). (...). Third, it appears to be 
difficult to find a balanced integrity management approach combining both 
compliance and integrity strategies (Paine, 1994)” (Hoekstra and Heres, 2016).
Much of the literature assumes that institutional integrity systems constitute 
‘best practice’ and are universally applicable management. The best-practice 
approach is based on the belief that ethics institutions and infrastructures can 
be used in any organisation and the view that all organisations can improve 
ethical performance if they identify and implement best practices. According 
to Huberts (2014), it is possible to stress the ‘basics of an integrity system’ 
(Huberts, 2012, p. 190): Suggested instruments include rules, disciplinary poli-
cies, standards, codes of ethics, codes of standards, value management, ethi-
cal leadership, whistleblowing, job rotation, risk analysis, training, integrity 
plans, integrity monitoring, scandal management, registers, disclosure poli-
cies, ethical climate surveys, self-assessments, integrity officers, ethics com-
mittees and good working conditions. It is also widely accepted that precon-
ditions of effective ethics infrastructures include openness and independent 
control mechanisms because principles of ethics cast suspicion on any pro-
cess. In the meantime, there is also considerable consensus on what consti-
tutes bad practices, for example, the absence of free media and independent 
judicial systems, high levels of politicization, poor leadership, unfair HR poli-
cies, lack of training, unprofessional performance measurement etc. in which 
holders of Public Office and public officials discipline themselves.
Despite this listing of ingredients of integrity systems, the increasing interest 
in institutional integrity has not necessarily produced more clarity and consen-
sus on the effectiveness of ethics policies in different contexts and the right 
choice of policy instruments within the best-fit design of ethics infrastructures. 
More work is also needed as regards what types of incentives, or sanctions and 
enforcement practices work best to create motivation for responsible behav-
iour. Finally, it is unclear what kind of institutional integrity systems works best 
in different sectors and for different holders of public office (for example, in-
dependent and outside control is still rare in the case of parliaments).
Since discussions on ethics were dominated for a long time by bureaucratic, 
rational and legal approaches, there is also uncertainty about the need for 
and the effectiveness of other instruments, the right instrument mix, the role 
of self-regulation, and the relationship to other political, psychological and 
economical approaches. Again, others point to the need for more intrinsic 
incentives for doing good and warn against a too strong focus on compliance 
approaches. Here the focus shifts back on forth between those who wish to 
design sound organizational structures and coherent integrity management 
in order to tackle the individual causes of unethical behavior whereas others 
believe that it is important to focus on organizational causes. Especially, the 
development of conflicts of interest- and disclosure policies raises the ques-
tions as to the clarity of concepts, definitions, and who monitors, supervises 
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and control the various “conflicts” and “interests” (Stark, 2000). This question 
is closely linked to the question whether and how public administrations man-
age and monitor integrity policies as such.
Institutionalization (Hoekstra and Kaptein, 2012) is an important aspect of in-
tegrity management and addresses the question of how these concerted ef-
forts are thoroughly secured, anchored, embedded or safeguarded within the 
organization. Hoekstra “point out that there are two approaches to embed in-
tegrity measures within organizations: informal and formal institutionalization 
(Brenner, 1992). The nature of the informal approach is implicit, indirect and 
concerns less visible and tangible organizational aspects that, while affecting 
the ethical climate of the organization, are not primarily targeting ethics. This 
could include the behaviour of supervisors, the creation of shared values, fair 
remuneration, appraisal and promotion systems, and rewarding ‘good’ behav-
iour“. The formal approach is, however, explicit, direct and visibly aimed at pro-
moting ethical behaviour within organizations (Tenbrunsel et al., 2003).
At present, several reform trajectories exist which lead to innovations in the 
field of integrity management, but these highlight the existence of alternative 
models rather than a shift towards one common institutional reform model 
in the field of integrity. As already discussed, the search for a best-practice 
ethics infrastructure is confronted with a context and institution-based, frag-
mented-, situational and pragmatic reality. Overall, institutional differences 
– notably the levels of budgetary resources, social legitimacy, work systems, 
labour markets, education and training systems, work organisation and the 
collective organisation of employers and employees – mediate the impact of 
converging processes. Also, causes for unethical behavior may be found at 
individual, organizational, cultural- or societal level. Consequently, remedies, 
too, differ from case to case.
Consequently, the proposition for implementing institutional and organisa-
tional models such as ethics management systems and infrastructures is am-
biguous. As discussed earlier, the political and institutional world is currently 
moving away from universal best-practice institutional configurations towards 
more specific best-fit and individualized context-related models. New develop-
ments lean more towards the testing of new organisational models and work 
systems that fit into the national, regional, local or even organisational and 
leader-follower context. Best fit schools are associated with this contingency 
approach and argue that organisations must adapt their strategies and imple-
ment reforms to the specific local strategy and to its environment. Thus, in most 
countries, the effectiveness of any particular institutional integrity system will 
be determined by the degree of consistency amongst its constituent elements 
and the way they fit into the specific culture, organisation, climate and leader-
ship styles. Consequently, also the choice of policy instruments should be seen 
as a pluralist, non-deterministic and multipurpose approach that allows the ap-
plication of behavioural insights ‘throughout the policy process’, but always in 
combination with (classical) policy instruments that address individual, organi-
sational and systemic causes for unethical behavior (Ewert, 2020).
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It is interesting to note that academic discussions in the field of institutional 
integrity have also turned away from the ‘grand old’ dichotomy: value-based 
approaches versus compliance-based approaches. In the meantime, also so-
called “value based” countries wonder why new institutional designs and the 
search for “full integrity” did not produce the desired (superior) results. For 
example, Andersson claims for Sweden that corruption and conflicts of in-
terest vulnerabilities have increased (Andersson, 2019, p. 9). Hoekstra notes 
that – despite being an international forerunner in the field of integrity – the 
Netherlands focus on economic values than all other countries and financial 
constraints and saving measures had a negative impact on integrity polices. 
In the meantime, also in all Nordic States, mediated ethical scandals and the 
“personalization of politics” have become a standard feature of political life, 
even as regards minor offences and small deviant actions (Pollack et al., 2018). 
As such, the relationship between public institutions and integrity is full of 
conflicting interests. It is not a love affair (Ortman, 2015, p. 72). However, the 
concept of institutional integrity is becoming ever more complex and sepa-
rated from other institutional logics.
8 Conclusions
For a long time the concept of institutional integrity formed an integrated 
part of the bureaucratic concept. During the past decades, new ideas and 
concepts about institutional integrity are emerging. Today, concepts are ex-
panding as a separate public policy. Differently to the past, they are also dis-
connected from modern public management concepts. As Thompson noted 
decades ago: “We should not expect the rules of government ethics to be 
simple or to become simpler in the future. As government has become more 
complex, government ethics (…) are also likely to become more complex” 
(Thompson, 1992, p. 254).
Whereas traditional “integrated” bureaucratic logics failed, even the best 
new institutional integrity design only fill the gaps that other public policies 
and (managerial) system logics produce. Many countries are good at filling 
some gaps, or even many. However, recent trends in the field of rule of law, 
justice, freedom of press, politicization, corruption and conflicts of interests 
show worrying trends in the respective fields (even if we consider that it is 
difficult to measure these issues). All of these issues influence integrity and 
institutional integrity. And, vice versa.
As current concepts of integrity policies focus on the misconduct of individu-
als (and not, for example, of organisations), the management of integrity poli-
cies requires sophisticated and complex interventions and high expertise of 
those who are in charge of monitoring the conduct of the individuals working 
inside the institutions. However, overall, individualised monitoring is difficult, 
complex, time consuming and – increasingly - costly. Because the manage-
ment of integrity policies is becoming ever more complex and individualised, 
it is time to raise the question of whether or not it would be more effective 
to move from an individual “bad apple” approach to an institutional integrity 
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approach. Should, for example, the severity of integrity violations be judged 
by the impact and importance of the cases?
Also, from a governance approach, institutional integrity is a ‘plug-in policy’ 
that fills the gaps that other policies and other governance logics produce. 
It seems that different system logics in economy, law, politics and sciences 
contradict with each other. Consequently, progress in institutional integrity 
is not translated into more effectiveness of ethics standards as other sys-
tem imperatives generate reform outcomes that are in conflicts with objec-
tives of ethics policies. As such, also the field of public management is about 
managing conflicting objectives and values. The problem is clearly not with 
behavioural ethics nor with individualised approaches, but with individualisa-
tion and (moral) relativism as a trend becoming the dominant approach to 
understanding the very complex world of organisational behaviour and public 
service ethics. The problem is rather that expanding integrity policies should 
“repair” conflicting management logics. They can not.
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